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differ	 significantly	 from	 mainline	 railways,	 being	 closed	 systems,	 with	 shorter	 headways,	 a	 greater	
number	of	stations	and	more	signals	encountered.	This	paper	aims	to	investigate	the	effects	of	design-
related	 performance	 shaping	 factors	 on	 metro	 driver	 performance,	 by	 analysing	 historical	 incident	
records	for	the	2011-13	period	on	the	Tyne	&	Wear	(T&W)	Metro	(UK).	Bivariate	statistical	analysis	has	
been	 used,	 to	 assess	 the	 potential	 inter-dependency	 of	 the	 performance	 shaping	 factors	 and	 other	
common	 causal	 factors,	 for	 various	 driver-related	 incident	 types.	 In	 addition	 to	 category	 A	 Signals	
Passed	at	Danger	incidents	(SPaDs),	station	overruns,	and	incidents	associated	with	station	procedures	
have	 also	 been	 assessed.	 The	 results	 show	 the	 significant	 importance	 of	 the	 location	 (design)	 based	















leader	 in	 railway	 industry,	 United	 Kingdom	 still	 sees	 hundreds	 of	 major	 passenger	 and	 workforce	
incidents	annually	(1).	Even	the	incidents	receiving	the	most	of	attention	since	the	beginning	of	the	21st	
century,	 signals	 passed	 at	 danger	 (SPaDs),	 still	 occur	 in	 numbers.	 According	 to	 (1)	 2014/15	 saw	 299	
SPaDs	 in	 the	 UK,	 including	 Tyne	 &	 Wear	 Metro	 system.	 Looking	 closer	 into	 the	 T&W	 Metro’s	








Despite	 the	 technological	 advances	 of	modern	 systems,	 a	 typical	 railway	 still	 depends	 on	 the	 safety-




this	discipline	 is	evidenced	by	the	 increased	 involvement	of	 	human	factor	specialists	 	 in	the	design	of	
railway	systems	(4).	
Understanding	performance	shaping	factors	(PSFs)	can	help	create	safety-critical	systems	that	include	a	
human	operator	as	an	asset,	 rather	 than	a	 risk	 carrier.	 	Blackman,	Gertman	 (5)	describe	a	PSF	as	 “an	
aspect	 of	 the	 human’s	 individual	 characteristics,	 environment,	 organization,	 or	 task	 that	 specifically	
decrements	or	improves	human	performance”.	In	other	words,	PSFs	are	factors	that	have	an	effect	on	
the	 likelihood	 of	 human	 error.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 characteristics	 of	 using	 PSFs,	 is	 the	
recognition	 that	 human	 error	 is	 caused	 by	 a	 mix	 of	 different	 factors,	 thus	 acknowledging	 inter-
dependence	 (6).	 Progress	 in	 this	 research	 area	will	 potentially	 provide	 a	means	 to	 estimate	 a	 holistic	
response	to	any	design	alterations	in	the	system.		Previous	research	has	highlighted	the	importance	of	








as	 related	 to	 driver	 performance,	 followed	 by	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 design	 and	 operational	
characteristics	of	 the	T&W	Metro.	 Further	 sections	of	 the	paper	 introduce	 the	 research	methodology	
used,	 prior	 to	 presenting	 the	 results.	 Finally,	 these	 results	 are	 discussed	 and	 summarised	 in	 the	
conclusions.		
Rail	human	factors	
Despite	 the	advancement	of	 rail	human	 factors,	 there	 is	no	holistic	understanding	of	 the	 influence	of	
design-related	 PSFs	 on	 train	 driver	 performance.	 	 Existing	 research	 appears	 to	 be	 fragmented	 and	 is	
usually	 focused	on	 a	 single	 design	 aspect	 of	 a	 railway	 system.	 Several	 studies	 have	 looked	 at	 various	
parts	 of	 the	 railway	 system	design,	 rather	 than	 the	whole.	 For	 instance,	 the	 effects	 of	 low	 frequency	
noise	 in	 the	 cab	environment,	 inducing	 stress,	 fatigue,	depression	and	errors	of	 judgement,	has	been	
studied	 (8-11).	 The	 inter-dependency	 of	 tilt	 angle	 in	 tilting	 trains,	 and	 various	 anthropometric	
parameters	of	passengers	in	motion	sickness	propagation,	have	been	reported	by	Beard	and	Griffin	(12).	
Similarly,	 the	 relationship	 between	 user-centred	 cab	 component	 design,	 and	 driver	 workload	 and	
performance,	 has	 been	 explored	 by	 Hitchcock,	 Morris	 (13),	 Sumpor,	 Tos	 (14)	 and	 Van	 Der	 Weide,	
Frieling	(15).	Research	on	driver-machine	interaction	and	cab-signalling	has	been	conducted	with	a	focus	
on	driver	workload	and	 situational	 awareness	 (16-18).	 Signal	 sighting,	 and	 infrastructure	design,	have	
been	explored	from	the	human	factors	perspective	(19-22).	The	UK’s	Network	Rail	has	produced	internal	
policies	 to	 increase	 the	 integration	 of	 human	 factors	 into	 areas	 such	 as	 signalling	 design,	 human-





to	help	determine	causal	 factors	 in	SPaDs	(25).	For	 instance,	the	UK’s	Rail	Safety	and	Standards	Board	
(RSSB)	 released	 a	 guide	 for	 the	 industry	 to	 support	 the	 understanding	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 the	 rail	
environment	 (26).	 A	 significant	 part	 of	 this	 guide	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 design	 of	 the	 immediate	 physical	
environment	 of	 the	 driver,	 including	 equipment	 and	 workplace	 design.	 It	 is	 acknowledged	 by	 the	
industry	 that	 successful	 system	 design	 can	 mitigate	 adverse	 environmental	 effects	 that	 significantly	
undermine	driver	 performance	 (27).	 Concentrating	on	human	 factors	 early	 in	 the	design	 stages	 helps	
eliminate	a		substantial	amount	of		risk,	by	reducing	the	number	of	human/system-related	clashes	(4).		
To	the	authors’	knowledge	there	is	no	specific	literature	available	focusing	on	metro	systems	from	the	
HF	and	PSF	perspectives.	Metro	systems	differ	 from	mainline	 railways	 in	ways	 that	might	 significantly	
change	incident	propagation	processes.	A	typical	metro	is	a	closed	system	that	is	smaller	than	mainline	
railway	systems.	The	variability	of	infrastructure,	rolling	stock	and	routes	is	also	significantly	reduced	in	
metro	systems.	Therefore,	metro	drivers	generally	 follow	identical	routes,	 in	 identical	rolling	stock,	on	
every	shift,	which	enhances	route	knowledge.	According	to	Naweed	(28),	route	knowledge	is	one	of	the	
most	 important	 driver	 skills,	 as	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 moving	 authority	 is	 often	 hidden	 from	 a	
driver’s	view.	Furthermore,	in	terms	of	training,	the	smaller	variability	in	encountered	scenarios	means	
faster	and	more	thorough	route	learning	(28).	In	addition,	urban	railways	are	high	capacity	systems	with	
short	 headways	 and	 shorter	 distances	 between	 stations.	 Consequently,	 metro	 drivers	 not	 only	












considered	 the	“core”	of	 the	system,	as	both	 routes	pass	 through	 it,	and	 thus	 it	has	 the	highest	daily	
throughput	of	trains.	
The	majority	 of	 the	 stations	 in	 the	 T&W	Metro	 system	 are	 located	 overground.	 There	 are	 only	 eight	













2).	 Type	 1	 stations	 are	 overground	 stations	 and	 some	 subsurface	 stations.	 Type	 2	 stations	 are	 only	
overground	 stations,	whereas	 type	 3	 designs	 can	 be	 seen	 only	 at	 the	Newcastle	 and	 Sunderland	 city	
centre	 underground	 stations.	 All	 of	 these	 design	 types	 include	 driver	 only	 operation	 (DOO)	 dispatch	











two-aspect	 signalling,	 with	 occasional	 fixed	 distants	 and	 three-aspect	 signals.	 However,	 the	 Pelaw	 to	
Sunderland	 route	 uses	 Network	 Rail	 infrastructure	 and	 consequently	 utilises	 standard	mainline	 four-
aspect	signalling,	with	yellow	and	double	yellow	signals.	The	Pelaw	–	Sunderland	route	section	is	shared	
with	 both	 passenger	 and	 freight	 mainline	 trains,	 which	 operate	 at	 various	 speeds.	 The	 Gateshead	
Stadium	–	Pelaw	section	runs	parallel	to	the	Network	Rail	infrastructure,	with	Metro	drivers	able	to	see	
mainline	 tracks	 and	 signals.	 As	 of	May	 2015,	 signals	 using	 LED	 technology	were	 installed	 only	 at	 the	
depot	section.	Metro	drivers	do	not	have	benefit	of	the	Automatic	Warning	System	(AWS),	or	the	Train	
Protection	and	Warning	System	(TPWS),	available	to	mainline	train	drivers	at	the	shared	route.	A	fixed	
block	 command	&	 control	 system	 is	 used	 in	 the	 T&W	Metro.	 	 The	 Automatic	 Train	 Protection	 (ATP)	
system	 controls	 overspeeding	 and	 Signal	 Passed	 at	 Danger	 (SPaD)	 at	 certain	 locations	 only.	 The	 ATP	









An	 in-depth	 examination	of	 statistical	 trends	 allows	 for	 the	uncovering	 of	 potential	 causal	 factors	 for	





reports	 from	 the	 2011/12	 and	 2012/13	 operating	 years	 were	made	 available.	 Each	 operating	 year	 is	
divided	into	13,	four-week	long	periods,	and	Table	1	shows	the	dates	for	each	period	of	2012/13.	
Table	1	Dates	of	the	13	operating	periods	of	2012/13		
























The	data	are	based	on	 the	entries	contained	 in	 the	 incident	 reporting	 system.	Each	 incident	 is	 logged	
with	a	description,	date,	 time	and	 location,	 as	well	 as	being	allocated	an	 incident	 type.	 Such	 incident	
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types	are	grouped	into	larger	categories,	e.g.	“technical	domain	incidents”.	The	current	reporting	system	
is	 focused	 on	 operational	 incidents,	 especially	 technical	 faults.	 To	 perform	 the	 analysis,	 a	 new	
categorisation	of	the	incident	reports	was	required,	as	well	as	selecting	the	incident	types	to	be	retained.	
The	 categorisation,	 incident	 types	 used,	 and	 a	 brief	 description,	 are	 summarised	 in	 Table	 2.	 The	
categorisation	is	focused	on	driver-related	incidents,	but	some	of	the	technical	and	operational	domain	
incidents	are	also	retained.	 Incident	 reports	 that	did	not	 fit	any	of	 the	categories	were	excluded	 from	






Category	A	SPaD	 Category	 A	 Signal	 Passed	 at	 Danger	 (SPaD)	 occurs	 when	 a	














Wrong	route	 A	 driver	 sets	 an	 incorrect	 train	 description	 that	 later	 affects	
passenger	information	and	route	setting.	It	is	also	possible	for	





























for	 consistency.	 This	 was	 required	 because	 incident	 causal	 mechanisms	 related	 to	 time,	 date	 and	
location	usually	fall	into	different	PSFs	groups.	Time	and	date-related	factors	are	associated	with	lighting	
and	 climatic	 conditions,	 patronage	 numbers	 and	 type,	 and	 seasonality.	 Furthermore,	 time-related	
factors	 also	 include	 individual	 driver	 factors,	 e.g.	 circadian	 rhythms.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 location-
related	 data	 set	 allows	 the	 study	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 system	 design	 features	 on	 metro	 driver	
performance,	on	specific	parts	of	the	network.		
For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 paper,	 driver-related	 incidents	 are	 understood	 as	 a	 combination	 of	 different	
factors	 affecting	 a	 driver.	 Such	 a	 combination	 of	 factors,	 happening	 in	 a	 certain	 order,	 is	 capable	 of	
bypassing	the	safety	mechanisms	of	a	system.		




the	 exception	 of	 01:00:00	 to	 04:59:59,	 when	 only	 maintenance	 vehicles	 and	 trains	 operate	 on	 the	
system.	The	Metro’s	passenger	flow	has	two	peaks:	between	7	and	9	am,	and	from	4	to	6	pm.	To	cope	
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to	 obtain	 an	 overview	of	 the	Metro’s	 performance.	 Consistency	 of	 distributions	was	 checked	 only	 by	
plotting	polynomial	trend	lines	for	each	incident,	for	each	operating	year,	making	the	results	unreliable.	
Three	 incident	 peaks	 were	 discovered	 throughout	 the	 day,	 with	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 incidents	
occurring	between	12	and	2	pm.	 	 This	midday	peak	 led	 to	 several	 hypotheses	 about	 the	 influence	of	
certain	passenger	 types	at	 stations	 (the	elderly,	 children)	on	 incident	propagation,	with	only	a	 limited	
importance	 placed	 on	 the	 number	 of	 trains.	 Previous	 research	 suggests	 that	 the	 drastic	 change	 of	
environment	 at	 tunnel	 exit/entrance	 positively	 affects	 arousal	 levels	 (33),	 but	 the	 preliminary	






risk	 of	 incident	 two	 hours	 after	 starting	 a	 shift,	 due	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 vibrations	 causing	 a	
decrease	in	arousal	levels	(33,	34).	
Finally,	 research	 from	the	automotive	 industry	 indicates	 that	a	 long	exposure	to	monotonous	physical	









driver-related	 incident	 types	were	selected,	 to	carry-out	 in-depth	examination	of	 the	potential	 factors	
















Consistency	 in	 year-on-year	 distribution	 of	 a	 driver-related	 incident	 would	 suggest	 a	 clear-cut	
connection	 between	 the	 incident	 type	 and	 certain	 locations,	 times	 or	 periods.	 Associations	 found	
between	 the	 incident	 types	 indicate	 the	 potential	 presence	 of	 common	 causal	 factors.	 Exploring	
similarities	 in	 causal	 factors	has	 the	objective	of	enhancing	understanding	of	 the	 inter-dependency	of	
PSFs	 in	 metro	 systems.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 a	 correlation	 found	 does	 not	 always	 suggest	
causation.	 	 In	 many	 cases	 the	 relationships	 will	 be	 spurious	 correlations,	 meaning	 that	 there	 are	
common	factors	affecting	both	variables.		
The	 bivariate	 correlation	 analysis	 was	 carried	 out	 using	 IBM	 SPSS	 version	 22.	 	 All	 variables	 (incident	
types)	were	checked	for	normality	of	distributions	using	either	the	Shapiro-Wilk,	or	Smirnov-Kalmogorov	
test,	depending	on	sample	size	(37).	If	both	variables	were	found	to	be	normally	distributed,	the	Pearson	
Product	 Moment	 Correlation	 (PPMC)	 was	 used	 as	 the	 preferred	 correlation	 method.	 If	 one	 of	 the	
variables	was	not	normally	distributed,	then	the	Spearman	Rank	Correlation	(SRC)	technique	was	used.	
Results	



















Incident	type/Sample	type	 Date-based	 Time-based	 Location-based	
Category	A	SPaDs		 -0.565*	 -0.123	 0.283*	
Overspeeding	 -0.013	 0.244	 0.400**	
Failure	to	call	 0	 0	 0	
Station	overrun	 0.459	 0.221	 0.281*	
Passenger	entrapment	 -0.065	 0.601**	 0.353**	
Wrong	side	doors	activation	 -0.012	 0.427*	 0.543**	
Wrong	route	 -0.226	 0.395	 0.374**	
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Frequency	distributions	of	driver-related	incidents	
Table	 4	 summarises	 the	 results	 for	 the	 driver-related	 incidents,	 in	 the	 T&W	 Metro.	 It	 displays	 an	
overview	 of	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 driver-related	 incidents	 in	 each	 year.	 For	 the	 two	 years	 under	











Incident	type	 2011/12	 2012/13	 For	2	years	
Category	A	SPaD	 6.3%	 10.4%	 8.4%	
Overspeeding	 27.5%	 25%	 26.3%	
Failure	to	call	 2.8%	 0%	 1.2%	
Station	overrun	 6.3%	 4.8%	 5.6%	
Passenger	entrapment	 13.4%	 26.4%	 20.0%	
Wrong	side	doors	activation	 36.7%	 16.7%	 26.6%	
Proc	ImechE	Part	F:	J	Rail	and	Rapid	Transit	
	
Wrong	route	 7.0%	 16.7%	 11.9%	
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%	
	
Associations	between	incident	types	
In	 total,	60	associations	were	 found	between	 incident	 types.	Half	of	 these	associations	were	 found	 in	
the	 location-based	 data	 set,	 whereas	 the	 time-based	 and	 date-based	 samples	 had	 11	 and	 19	
associations,	 respectively.	 For	 time-based	 data,	 dispatch	 equipment	 faults	 account	 for	 50%	 of	 the	
associations	 found.	 All	 of	 the	 associations	 have	medium	 to	 high	 strength.	 In	 the	 date-based	 sample,	
Category	 A	 SPaDs	 have	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 associations	 (four),	 with	 one	 negative	 correlation	
between	 dispatch	 equipment	 faults	 and	 passenger	 over-carried	 incidents,	 and	 the	 majority	 of	


















































































between	midday	and	 the	evening	peak.	Majority	of	 station	overruns	happen	during	 late	Autumn	and	
Winter	months,	but	such	incidents	are	relatively	evenly	distributed	throughout	a	day.		There	is	a	peak	in	
passenger	entrapment	incidents	around	January,	with	an	overall	trend	for	such	incidents	starting	from	
October	 onwards.	 In	 terms	 of	 times	 of	 a	 day,	 the	 12-3	 pm	 peak	 for	 passenger	 entrapments	 was	







correlations	 with	 driver-related	 incidents	 from	 the	 location-based	 data	 set.	 The	 remaining	 additional	










































































































Category	A	SPaDs		 0.017	 0.008	 0.632**	 0.068	 0.535*	
Overspeeding	 -0.119	 -0.222	 0.528*	 0.304	 0.435*	
Overspeeding	(4	worst	performing)	 N/A	 N/A	 0.408	 0.292	 0.274	
Failure	to	call	 -0.111	 0.096	 0.115	 0.176	 -0.031	
Station	overrun	 0.094	 -0.026	 0.360	 0.191	 0.438*	
Station	overrun	(4	worst	performing)	 N/A	 N/A	 0.168	 0.016	 0.240	
Passenger	entrapment	 -0.224	 0.086	 0.594**	 0.086	 0.342	
Passenger	entrapment	(4	worst	performing)	 N/A	 N/A	 0.330	 -0.023	 0.116	
Wrong	side	doors	activations	 -0.213	 -0.195	 0.794**	 0.224	 0.580**	
Wrong	side	doors	activations	(4	worst	
performing)		
N/A	 N/A	 0.528*	 0.247	 0.414	









related	 incidents	suggests	 improvements	 in	 the	safety	culture	 (38)	as	well	as	positive	results	 from	the	
Metro	operator’s	effort	to	increase	driver	reporting	rates.	The	changes	in	composition	of	driver-related	
incidents	 (table	 4)	 allow	 tracking	 the	 operator’s	 initiatives	 to	 address	 wrong-side	 door	 operation	
problem	and	reporting	of	passenger	entrapments.	On	the	other	hand,	it	also	shows	lack	of	progress	with	
category	A	SPaDs,	overspeeding	and	wrong	route	incidents.				
The	 composition	 of	 driver-related	 incidents	 on	 the	 Metro	 (Table	 4)	 demonstrates	 that	 almost	 half	
happen	while	drivers	are	carrying	out	 their	 station	duties.	This	accounts	 for	 five	 times	more	 incidents	
than	 category	A	 SPaDs,	 despite	 a	 significant	 research	 focus	 on	 the	 latter	 incident	 type.	Overspeeding	
accounts	for	a	significant	proportion	of	the	incidents	and	requires	in-depth	analysis.		
The	 consistency	 analysis	 (Table	 3)	 confirmed	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 preliminary	 study,	 where	 the	
importance	of	 location-based	 factors	was	discovered.	Significant	 localisation	 to	certain	 stations	allows	
the	 study	 of	 each	 incident	 type	 and	 the	 drawing	 of	 hypotheses	 about	 elements	 of	 physical	 design	
contributing	 to	 driver	 performance	 there.	 The	 lack	 of	 year-on-year	 consistency	 for	 Category	 A	 SPaDs	
suggests	 the	 importance	 of	 individual	 driver	 factors.	 Better	 consistency	was	 expected	 from	 the	 date-
based	sample,	at	 least	 for	station	overrun	and	failure	to	call	 incidents,	as	 those	mostly	happen	during	






No	 associations	 were	 found	 between	 the	 approach	 distance	 and	 incident	 locations	 (table	 6).	 As	 the	
longest	 approach	 time	 in	 the	Metro	 is	 only	 two	and	 a	 half	minutes,	 it	 is	 possibly	 not	 long	 enough	 to	
induce	boredom	or	to	reduce	driver	vigilance.	However,	research	from	the	automotive	industry	shows	
that	 sensory	 deprivation	 starts	 to	 appear	 rapidly	 in	monotonous	 environments	 (35).	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 say	
what	constitutes	a	monotonous	environment	for	metro	drivers,	however	it	should	not	be	very	different	








the	network	where	 two	 lines	merge)	has	almost	no	driver-related	 incidents,	proving	 the	 incidents	are	
not	caused	simply	by	the	number	of	trains.	Hence	it	 is	safe	to	say	that	number	of	trains	 in	the	system	
only	induces	existing	issues	of	driver	performance,	at	the	worst	performing	locations.	It	also	means	that	




not	 provide	 any	 additional	 increase	 in	 alertness	 or	 arousal	 levels.	 Twenty-four	 such	 locations	 were	
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identified	and	explored,	demonstrating	10%	higher	 incident	 levels	 compared	 to	 the	 rest	of	 the	Metro	
network.	 This	 contradicts	 findings	 from	mainline	 railways	 (33)	 and	 road,	 but	 can	 be	 explained	by	 the	
specific	skill	and	mind	set	requirement	of	metro	drivers,	as	well	as	the	comparative	population	size.	This	
notion	of	 the	dip	 in	performance,	 if	 incorporated	 into	metro	driver	 training	and	rostering,	could	bring	
significant	safety	benefits.		
Metro	infrastructure	vs	Network	Rail	infrastructure	
The	 existence	 of	 the	 shared	 section	 between	 the	 Metro	 and	 NR	 allows	 for	 comparison	 of	 the	
infrastructure,	 using	 the	 incident	 statistics.	 First,	 the	 number	 of	 driver-related	 incidents	 on	 the	 NR	
infrastructure	is	7.5%	lower	than	on	the	Metro	infrastructure.	However,	there	are	75%	fewer	trains	on	
part	of	the	system,	compared	to	the	central	corridor,	thus	supporting	the	conclusion	that	the	number	of	
trains	 is	 not	 a	 causal	 factor	 in	 incident	 propagation.	 Secondly,	 one	 particular	 Type	 1	 station	
demonstrated	 several	 station	 overruns	 outside	 of	 the	 LRA	 season.	 This	 station	 deviates	 from	 the	
standard	 Type	 1	 design	 somewhat,	 as	 the	 running	 signals	 are	 located	 considerably	 further	 from	 the	
platform	edge	than	normal.	It	is	possible	that	the	Metro	drivers	use	a	running	signal	as	a	reference	point	
when	 selecting	 stopping	 position.	 Thirdly,	 only	 4.1%	 of	 the	 Category	 A	 SPaDs	 occurred	 at	 the	 NR	
infrastructure,	where	the	NR	four-aspect	signals	are	used,	even	though	this	part	of	the	Metro	accounts	
















position	 of	 a	 running	 signal	 changes	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 driver’s	 cab.	 Hence,	 situational	 awareness	




This	 design	 type	 features	 monitors	 and	 platform	 cameras	 for	 the	 DOO.	 Moreover,	 drivers	 only	 see	
approaching	 passengers	 when	 they	 enter	 a	 platform	 from	 a	 station	 atrium,	 thus	 losing	 situational	
awareness	 of	 events	 outside	 the	 platform.	Moreover,	 passenger	 loading	 at	 such	 stations	 sometimes	
makes	 it	 hard	 to	 achieve	 a	 clear	 view	 of	 the	 doors,	 using	 the	 existing	 small	 monitors	 and	 only	 two	
platform	cameras.	Proximity	to	schools	was	deemed	an	important	causal	factor	for	incident	levels	at	the	





Even	though	wrong	route	 incidents	are	mostly	 localised	to	 terminus	stations,	some	have	happened	at	
other	 locations,	 predominantly	 Type	 1.	 All	 of	 those	 stations	 were	 used	 as	 turn-around	 points	 during	
engineering	works,	 in	 the	 period	 under	 investigation.	Moreover,	 period-based	 statistics	 supports	 this	
connection.	It	is	possible	to	claim	that	the	Metro	drivers	are	struggling	with	procedures	that	are	not	part	
of	 their	 day-to-day	 driving,	 especially	when	 using	 the	 stations	 from	 a	 different	 platform,	 or	 from	 the	
wrong	direction.		
Importance	of	platform	side	and	speed	limits	
Tyne	&	Wear	Metro	 includes	 stations	of	 various	 types	and	 there	are	parts	of	 the	network	where,	 for	
example,	 a	 train	 departs	 a	 Type	 1	 station	 and	 arrives	 at	 a	 Type	 2	 or	 3.	 This	 is	where	 a	 platform	 side	
change	occurs.	It	was	expected	that	these	locations	would	be	hotspots	for	wrong	side	door	activations,	
but	the	data	demonstrate	a	more	complex	scene.	Even	though	three	out	of	the	four	worst	performing	
stations	 are	 associated	 with	 platform	 change,	 more	 than	 40%	 of	 such	 incidents	 happened	 at	 other	
stations.	Moreover,	the	mean	for	wrong	side	door	activations	at	non	platform	change	locations	is	higher	
than	 at	 the	 expected	 locations.	 Interestingly,	 most	 of	 the	 wrong	 side	 door	 incidents	 at	 the	 worst	
performing	station	(Type	3	-	29%	of	all	wrong	side	door	activations	in	the	Metro)	happen	travelling	from	
the	 direction	 that	 does	 not	 involve	 platform	 side	 change.	 There	 was	 a	 69%	 drop	 in	 such	 incidents	
between	 2011/12	 and	 2012/13	 at	 this	 location.	 This	 decrease	 happened	 after	 the	 backlight	 for	 an	
advertising	 board,	 situated	 next	 to	 a	 cab	 stopping	 position,	was	 changed	 to	 a	 less	 bright	 one	 at	 that	
station.	Furthermore,	Type	2	and	Type	3	line	terminus	stations	have	the	same	arrangement,	with	trains	
arriving	 at	 either	 of	 the	 two	 platforms,	 yet	 Type	 2	 station	 had	 no	 incident	 with	 the	 door	 release.	 It	
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from	 normal.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 drivers	 unconsciously	 select	 the	 set	 of	 doors	 to	 open,	 based	 on	 the	
position	of	a	 running	signal,	or	ambient	 lighting	conditions	 (platform	side	 is	always	brighter	at	Type	3	
stations).		
All	of	the	worst	performing	stations	for	overspeeding	 incidents	have	 low	speed	limits	 in	common.	The	
speed	 limit	 through	 these	 locations	 is	 between	 5	 and	 15	 kmph.	 The	 line	 terminus	 station,	 with	 the	
highest	number	of	 incidents	of	 this	 type,	 stands	out	 for	having	a	very	steep	drop,	 from	80	kmph	to	5	




Associations	 between	 the	 incident	 types	 mostly	 revealed	 the	 expected	 connections.	 For	 example,	




mechanisms	 and	 causal	 factors,	 for	 different	 incident	 types.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 most	
associations	were	 found	 in	 the	 location-based	data	sample,	even	though	the	coefficients	were	usually	
Rjabovs	and	Palacin	
higher	 in	 other	 samples.	 This	 shows	 the	 inter-dependability	 of	 different	 incident	 types,	 in	 terms	 of	
design-related	 factors,	 but	 raises	 a	 question	 about	 whether	 those	 factors	 are	 really	 influential	 or	
whether	there	is	simply	more	location-based	factors	involved	in	incident	propagation.		
Conclusions	
The	 paper	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 design-related	 factors	 in	 the	 propagation	 of	Metro	 incidents.	












driving	 portion	 of	 a	 shift.	 This	 finding,	 when	 used	 for	 rostering,	 could	 improve	 Metro’s	 safety	
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